Institutional Change and Governance Indexes in Transition Economies: the case of Poland by Pasquale Tridico
 
The European Journal of Comparative Economics 
Vol. 3, n. 2, pp. 197 238 
 
ISSN 1824 2979   
 
 
Available online at http://eaces.liuc.it 
Institutional Change and Governance Indexes in 
Transition Economies: the case of Poland 
Pasquale Tridico 
1  
Università di Roma 3 
 
Abstract 
In  the  former  communist  countries,  institutional  change,  i.e.  transition  towards  market  economy,  is 
affected not only by introduction of law and formal institutions (change “by design”), but also by social 
norms, old values and habits (informal institutions). I present an empirical paper focusing on transition of 
the Polish Economy. I used a questionnaire which was administered to a sample of about 1000 Polish 
firms in order to verify the impact of economic institutions on the “residual productivity”. Throughout 
the questionnaire I built six governance indexes. Then I tested the impact of the governance indexes on 
the productivity of firms. I observed that the economic performance of the eastern regions of Poland, 
where governance indexes are worse than western, are poorer than that of the western regions of Poland. 
JEL Classification: D24, K42, O17, P37, Z13.  
Keywords: formal and informal economic institutions, trust, transition economics, governance 
indexes, productivity. 
1.   Introduction 
There  has  been  burgeoning  literature  within  economics  that  discusses  and  analyses 
institutions (see North 1990; Nugent and Lin 1996; Nelson and Winter 1982; Jones and 
Hall 1998; Olson et al. 1998; Rodrik 1999; Robinson et al. 2001; Glaeser et al. 2004; 
Bardhan  2005).  The  attention  of  international  organisations  and  policy  makers  has 
focused  more  on  the  importance  of  institutions  for  economic  growth.  Institutional 
economists,  economic  research  centres  and  international  organisations  have  built 
indexes  of  governance  which  measure  an  institutional  quality  of  developing  and 
advanced countries. 
Generally,  institutional  indexes  have  common  aims,  namely  measuring  governance 
capacity and the quality of institutions. However, they use different methodologies and 
they are commissioned by different organisations such as the IMF, the World Bank, the 
EBRD and business clubs. Hence, these indexes are dissimilar because they depend on 
the  commissioners’  focus  of  research,  for  example,  investment  risk  taxonomy, 
corruption level, the quality of bureaucracy, political stability, etc. Some indexes, such as 
EBRD indexes and indexes of Kaufmann, Kray and Zoido Lobatio 2003, are essential 
for a comparison of formal economic institutions among countries and measuring the 
impact of formal institutions. However, very little attention has been paid to informal 
institutions. 
In this paper I will propose some governance indexes which can capture the reality of 
transition  economics  in  Central  and  Eastern  European  Countries  (CEECs).  They 
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Naccarato, Giacomo Sbrana, and all the participants of the 2004 EAEPE conference (University of Crete, 
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encompass different dimensions of institutional change occurring in those countries. I 
have  built  some  indexes  of  governance  which  take  into  account  elements  that  are 
evolving  in  transition  economies,  such  as:  property  rights,  habits,  values,  informal 
institutions, quality of bureaucracy, support of public institutions to business and a cost 
of institutional transformation. I think that formal and informal economic institutions 
captured by my indexes have a significant impact on the productivity as a “residual”.  
I have used a questionnaire administered to a significant sample of Polish firms in order 
to discover formal and informal spheres of economic institutions affecting an economic 
agent’s behaviour. In particular, my indexes aim to capture the following concepts: 1) 
Support of public institutions for the firms; 2) Lobbying and rent seeking; 3) Persistence 
of  informal  institutions  and  previous  habits;  4)  Corruption;  5)  Other  official  and 
unofficial  costs  coming  from  institutional  transformation  such  as:  acquiring  new 
property  rights,  building  new  public  institutions  and  governmental  agencies,  etc;  6) 
Harmonisation of formal economic institutions to EU law; 7) Impact of foreign direct 
investments;  8)  Legal  system  and  reinforcing  of  property  rights;  9)  Trust  between 
econmic agents and, generally, trust in the public institutions. The governance indexes 
which  I  have  proposed  are  the  following  six: Trust;  Support  of  Public  Institutions; 
Corruption  and  Extra Costs;  Adjustment  of  Formal  Institutions;  Persistence  of 
Informal Institutions; Legal System and Property Rights. In addition, I propose also 
some  measurements  of  economic  performance  of  the  firms,  such  as:  productivity, 
employment and turnover.  
The aim of this paper is to evaluate the impact of economic institutions, both formal 
and informal, on the economic performance, during the institutional change of CEECs. 
I  use  both  subjective  answers  of  firms  concerning  productivity  trend  and  actual 
productivity data of the same firms. My hypothesis is that certain informal rules of 
former planned economies such as lobbying, rent seeking, privileges, old habits and 
values are predominant in the new market economies and influence relations between 
economic agents. Moreover, my analysis attempts to explain the difference, in terms of 
GDP and economic development, between eastern and western Poland. I claim that in 
the West, better governance allows for a better economic performance than in the East. 
The  paper  is  composed  as  follows:  in  section  2  I  explain  my  hypotheses;  in  2.1  I 
describe the adopted methodology; in 2.2 I discuss the sample composition; in 2.3 I 
describe the questionnaire; in section 3 I present the construction of my governance 
indexes; in section 4 I prove a statistical difference between East and West Poland’s 
indexes; in section 5, through a chi square ( χ² ) analysis and contingency tables of the 
questionnaire  responses,  I  start  to  observe  a  correlation  between  indexes  and 
productivity; in section 6 I use an ordered probit model in order to see how far indexes 
and productivity are correlated, then in section 7 and 7.1 I discuss and withdraw some 
implications of governance index differentials for the Polish dualism. Moreover, in 7.1 I 
use an OLS model to correlate my indexes and actual productivity data of respondent 
firms. I conclude with some final remarks. 
2.   Concepts and Hypotheses  
My  empirical  research  focuses  on  the  economic  transition  of  Poland,  using  a 
questionnaire  addressed  to  a  sample  of  Polish  firms.  The  aim  is  to  build  some 
governance and institutional quality indexes. Hence, I will estimate the impact of these 
indexes on the economic performance of Polish firms. The indexes I built differ from  
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other  governance  indexes  because  they  capture  two  important  features:  informal 
institutions and an extra cost factor.  
The extra cost factor is the transformation institutional cost which seems to be very 
important in former communist countries and which is entailed by acquiring costs of 
property rights in uncertain circumstances, by starting up costs of new governmental 
agencies, by corruption, by unofficial and official costs of bargaining between agents in 
the economic transactions, by costs of emerging market institutions. The features of the 
extra cost  factor  are  captured  by  the  Index:  Extra Cost  and  Corruption,  which  I 
suppose (H.1) has a negative impact on economic growth.  
Informal institutions are norms, values, routines and social rules which affect in several 
ways  the  economic  behavior  of  agents  and  their  choices  (Nugent  and  Lin  1996). 
Informal institutions can be divided in two groups: 
Informal institutions which, I assume (H.2), have a negative impact on the economic 
growth (old rules from the previous regime inconsistent with the new ones, old lobbies 
linked to particular groups, inertia to the institutional change, privileges, lobbying and 
rent seeking). They are captured by the index “Persistence of Informal Institutions” 
Informal institutions which imply trust, respect of the agreements and of agreed rules, 
cooperation relations between agents, mutual confidence among parties to an economic 
transaction, exchange of information and circulation of knowledge, in a broader sense 
“Social Capital” (Raiser 1999). I assume (H.3) that they have a positive impact on the 
economic growth. These are captured by the index "Trust".  
 
Other hypotheses which I aim to test are the following: 
 
H.4 Economic institutions, both formal and informal, affect the economic behaviour of 
agents by imposing social constraints and structuring social interactions, and have a 
strong impact on the economic performance. 
H.5  The  better  the  governance  and  the  quality  of  formal  economic  institutions  are 
(legality, property rights, support of the public institutions, bureaucracy, and adjustment 
of  the  national  institutions  to  EU  norms)  the  greater  positive  impact  on  economic 
performance is. 
H.6 Governance, quality of economic institutions, and formal and informal institutions 
are very different in the East and the West of Poland. 
H.7 The  difference  in  productivity  and  in  general  the  dualism  between  eastern  and 
western Poland is due, under the same conditions (i.e. technology, human and physical 
capital),  to  the  institutional  factor,  i.e.:  diversity  of  economic  institutions,  different 
governance and above all to the informal sphere of the economic institutions. 
 
Some  of  the  hypotheses  listed  have  been  extensively  discussed  in  the  institutional 
economic debate (H.1: Commons 1934, Knight 1992; H.3: Arrow 1975, Olson 1982; 
H.4: Kaufmann et al. 2003; H.5: Alchian 1950). Moreover, all of them are strongly 
linked. This means that verifying some of them could justify the others. Therefore, I will 
test those hypotheses by groups: (H.1 H.2 H.3 H.4 H.5); (H.6 H.7). 
2.1  Methodology 
In  order  to  verify  my  hypotheses  I  used  a  Business  Survey  methodology.  I  built  a 
questionnaire, composed of 40 questions addressed to a sample of Polish firms and 
structured according to the criteria that I will present below. The questionnaire contains  
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questions about the sphere of institutional economics and governance, from the support 
of public and administrative institutions, to the trust relations between economic agents, 
corruption, illegal costs, bribes, the informal economy, property rights, persistence of 
old  economic  institutions,  harmonisation  to  EU  norms  and  other  national  law,  the 
impact of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI),  the  legal environment, the presence of 
lobbies, interest groups, etc. To sum up, my questionnaire tries to test the impact of 
economic institutions on the Polish economy during institutional change by applying a 
concept of institutions which reflects a wider definition of economic institutions and 
embraces both the formal and informal sphere of institutions. 
In  particular,  I  want  to  verify,  from  an  empirical  point  of  view,  whether  informal 
institutions and not only formal institutions, affect the behaviour of economic agents 
and  have  an  impact  on  economic  performance  (productivity)  and  on  economic 
development. The economic agents examined in this research project are only the firms. 
The measurement of the impact will be analysed through the comparison of six indexes 
of governance with productivity. I will analyse the impact of the indexes on economic 
performance by dividing the 16 Polish voivodships into two macro regions, the regions of 
the East and the regions of the West. The line of division between the East and West is 
a geographic border, the Vistula river. The reason why I decided to analyse Poland 
dividing it into 2 macro regions finds its fundament in the history.
2 The Vistula divides 
Poland nearly in half, from the Baltic Sea to the south of Poland. The Vistula is also a 
cultural, political and economic border for Poland. For centuries it has represented the 
dividing line between two very different political and administrative systems.  
Economic, political and social factors of these two regions seem to be very different in 
many aspects, similar to those observed in the Italian North/South dualism (Gorzelak 
1999).  The  differences  between  the  East  and  West  are  apparent  in  terms  of  GDP, 
unemployment and infrastructure (Walsh, 2000). The split between the East and the 
West emerges in the dimension of the informal institutions (the indexes "Persistence of 
the informal institutions" and "Trust" seem to capture this division). Although the law 
and formal institutions are the same throughout the country, the informal rules often 
differ  significantly  and  consequently  also  the  economic  performance  differs.  This 
dualism emerges also in the quality of the administrative divisions, in the effectiveness 
of  the  law,  and,  therefore,  in  the  quality  of  formal  institutions  and  governance 
capabilities.  Hence,  it  is  necessary  to  have,  as  I  proposed,  disaggregate  indexes  for 
macro regions, in order to capture these significant differences between western and 
eastern Poland.  
The economic divergence between the East and West is a phenomenon based on 3 
important elements: 1) higher income, 2) lower unemployment, and 3) better economic 
development in western than eastern Poland (Transition Report 2000; Country Report 
Poland   EIU 2000; Gorzelak 1999; Blazyca and Rapacki, 2001). The explanation of 
these differences can be found, I predict, in the difference of the economic institutions, 
both formal and informal. Consequently, I will test how economic institutions impact 
on "residual" productivity in eastern and western Poland. 
                                                 
2 The origin of the Poland’s East/West dualism can be found in the different partitions of Poland between 
1776 1918 which divided the country into several administrative parts under foreign powers such as: 
Prussia, the Austrian Empire and Russia. Russian occupation was consolidated to the East of the Vistula 
river, while the German occupation was attested to the west side. For interesting information on the 
history of the partition and occupation of Poland see: Norman Davies (2001).  
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2.2   Sample Composition  
My  sample  is  composed  of  812  Polish  firms.  It  is  structured  so  as  to  have  a 
representative  sample  of  the  entire  Polish  economy.  The  firms  are  sampled  from  a 
directory of the Polish Chamber of Commerce which contains more than 200.000 firms 
representing the whole Polish business environment.
3 The criteria I used are as close as 
possible to the ones used by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
(EBRD) and by the World Bank
4 which carry out research in the CEECs and the former 
Soviet Union. These criteria should control for problems correlated with location, size, 
ownership,  sector,  and  export  activity.
5  Moreover,  differences  in  technology  and  in 
physical  and  human  capital  among  firms,  although  could  affect,  in  a  second  phase, 
productivity differently, are theoretically considered to be initially available in the same 
way. The institutions and the governance should affect the way how firms reach certain 
levels  of  knowledge  and  not  the  opposite  (Antonelli,  2005).  The  criteria  are  the 
following: 
 
Geographical: at least 15% of the firms were required to be allocated in towns with less 
than 50,000 inhabitants or in rural areas. 
 
Size: at least 15% of firms were required to have under 50 employees and 15% were 
required to have over 250 employees. 
 
State Ownership: at least 20% of the firms should be state owned. 
 
Foreign Ownership: at least 15% of the firms were required to be under at least 51% 
foreign ownership . 
 
Sector: each productive sector has to be represented by at least 15% of the sample. 
 
Export: at least 15% of the firms have to be to exporters (by at least 20% of output). 
 
Below, I present a table with a detailed description of the sample by region, ownership, 
and sector of production. 
                                                 
3 Business CD 2003, Hoppenstedt Bonnier, Chamber of Commerce of Poland. 
4 I refer, in particular, to a periodic Survey carried out jointly by the EBRD and the World Bank, called 
BEEPS, “Business Environment and Enterprises Performance Survey”, (Transition Report 2005) and 
conducted  in  26  countries  of  Central  and  Eastern  Europe  and  the  former  Soviet  Union  (except 
Turkmenistan). The first one was published in 1999, the second one in 2002, and the last in 2005. 
5 Doing so I will avoid weighting the final indexes   which I will build through the questionnaire answers   
by location, firm size, sector, ownership and export activity (See Hellman et al. 2000).   
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Table 1. Sample composition 
OWNERSHIP  Productive Sectors  WOJEWÓD
ZTWA  
(REGIONS)  State/
Muni 
cipal 
firms 
Privat
e 
firms 
Coopera
tive 
Firms 
Foreig
n 
owners
hip 
Agricul
ture 
Indu
stry 
Servi
ces 
TOT. 
by 
owner
ship & 
sector
s 
DOLNOŚLĄS
KIE  6  35  5  5  12   22  17   51 
KUJAWSKO  
POMORSKIE  15  35  7  5   15  34  13  61 
ŁÓDZKIE  16  20  7  7  19   19  12  50 
LUBELSKIE  15  12  12  6  15  19  11  45 
LUBUSKIE   2  5  2  4  3  4  6  13 
MAŁOPOLSK
IE  25  25  11  10   23  20  28  71 
MAZOWIEKI
E  13  18  11  80   21  9  92  122 
OPOLSKIE  7  7  12  3  5   15  9  29 
PODKARPAC
KIE  12  29  9  3  6  22  25  53 
PODLASKIE   25  14  12  16  9  34  24  67 
POMORSKIE  16  29  12  9  22  37  7  66 
ŚLĄSKIE  27  30  5  8  26  27  17  70 
ŚWIĘTOKRZ
YSKIE  10  11  5  9  10  17  8  35 
WARMINSKO
 MAZURSKIE  8  12  8  3  8  16  7  31 
WIELKOPOL
SKIE  8  20  7  4   7  21  11  39 
ZACHODIO  
POMORSKIE  5  6  5  5  6  6  8  21 
 TOTAL  210  308  131  177  207  316  287  826 
 
The following table summarizes the percentage, by main dimensions, of the sampled 
firms. This table confirms again the strong and genuine productive dualism between 
East and West Poland. In fact in the East one can notice a lower presence of firms. 
Therefore in my sample there were 201 firms from the East (Warminsko Mazurskie, 
Podlaskie, Podkarpackie, and Lubelskie)
6 and 625 from the West (the rest of the listed 
regions above).  
 
                                                 
6 However, few firms from Mazoweckie and Malopolskie Regions were considered to be part of the East, 
since Vistula River, our conventional border between East and West, passes right across these two 
regions.  
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Table 2. Sample composition in percentage by main dimensions 
  State  Private  Cooperative  Foreign 
ownership  Total by ownership 
Firms   25%  39%  10%  26%  100% 
  Agriculture  Industry  Service    Total by sector 
Firms   24%  39%  37%    100% 
  West  East      Total by two macro 
regions 
 Firms  77%  23%      100% 
 
As regards the respondent firms to my questionnaire, their composition seems to reflect 
the sample structure well. This is because, in line with the usual EBRD procedure, in 
order to obtain a greater number of answers to the questionnaire, I proposed an under 
sample of about 200 firms with the same features as the original sample. The firms were 
reminded to participate in the survey. This contributed to obtaining a sufficiently high 
rate of answers for a statistical significance (more than 11%), and the outcome structure 
was similar to the sample structure with 91 responding firms. 
The respondents reflect the genuine business environment of the two parts of Poland as 
represented by the above mentioned Directory of the Polish Chamber of Commerce. In 
this directory (which closely reflects the Polish environment), around 76% of firms are 
from  the  West  and  24%  from  the  East,  considering  the  Vistula  River.  Hence  the 
difference in the answers received (80% from the West and 20% from the East) seems 
to reflect this Polish East West diversity. Moreover the three sectors (industry, service 
and agriculture) are represented in the respondent outcome with more or less the same 
proportion  as  my  sample  (respectively  35%,  46%,  19%).  Other  features  were 
considered, such as ownership, size of firms and export. Each dimension is present in 
the outcome of the sample with not less than 20% (as regards size), and 15% as regards 
ownership. This reflects more or less the sample composition without serious selection 
bias in the outcome of the sample. 
2.3  The Questionnaire 
The questionnaire (attached in Appendix) composed of 40 questions, was written in 
Polish and in English, and was administered to the sample previously selected via e mail 
and fax.
7 The questions can be conceptually divided into six groups, as given in the 
indexes that I have built. 
Each group of questions is aggregated in order to build a coherent index. Moreover, 
there  is  a  group  of  questions  about  performance  of  the  firms.  It  encompasses  the 
productivity  trend,  employment  and  turnover.  In  order  to  aggregate  answers,  I 
translated the firms' answers into various indexes following the simple method of the 
Likert scale.
8 The respondents were managers or owners. Each respondent was asked to 
answer the questions picking one of five alternatives as in the following example:  
 
Table 3. (example). Likert Scale 
                                                 
7 The questionnaire was administered during June July 2003 while I was conducting a field research in 
Poland. 
8 The respondents are presumed to know how to distinguish the scale and therefore to choose the right 
answer.  
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5  4  3  2  1 
Very Good  Good  Sufficient  Bad  Very Bad 
Fully Agree  Agree in most 
cases 
Tend to 
agree 
Disagree in most 
cases 
Completely 
disagree 
Always  Usually  Sometimes  Seldom  Never 
A lot  Quite a lot  Few  Very little  None 
No 
obstacles 
Very few 
obstacles 
Few 
obstacles 
Quite a lot of 
obstacles  A lot of obstacles 
 
The  answers  to  the  questionnaire  try  to  capture  certain  concepts  which,  when 
aggregated compose the indexes. The aggregation of answers was possible thanks to the 
fact that all the possible answers range between 1 and 5 as in the indexes having the 
same range. Moreover, the aggregated answers have in common the concept that they 
try to capture. For example, all the questions about the quality of the services offered by 
the  public  administration,  public  agencies,  bureaucracy,  the  government  etc.,  are 
aggregated in the same group under the index: “Support of Public institutions”. At the 
same time, the questions about unofficial costs, bribes, illegal costs in the transaction 
and in the distribution of new property rights, etc., are in the group under the index 
Extra Cost and Corruption.  
 
Table 4.  
INDEXES  Content of the questions 
Support of Public 
Institutions (Support) 
Quality of bureaucratic services; government policy supporting 
business; public information agencies; banking and financial services. 
Adjustment to Formal 
Institutions (Formal) 
Harmonization to EU law; FDI impact; respect and introduction of 
new national law; enforcement of competition policies and, in general, 
of market rules. 
Persistence of Informal 
Institutions (Informal) 
Old rules of the previous regime; old lobbies linked to particular groups; 
informal information network; privileges; rent seeking; resistance & 
inertia of particular social groups to the change. 
Legal System and property 
rights (Legal) 
Quality of legal and judicial Systems; introduction and reinforcing of 
property rights. 
Trust (Trust) 
Trust between agents; trust towards foreign investors; trust in the public 
institutions; cooperation with other agents. 
Extra Cost Factor and 
Corruption
9 
(Extra Cost Corruption) 
Corruption; bribes; unofficial payments; other off board and illegal 
costs; bargaining costs of economic transaction and acquisition costs of 
property rights (a cost of the institutional change) in situations of 
uncertainty. 
Notes: (in parentheses, the abbreviations of the name of the indexes) 
 
The aggregation of answers is calculated on the basis of the answers given by a firm for 
each group of questions throughout the arithmetic mean. I have six groups of questions 
and I have six indexes. In this way I obtained an indicator for each firm. This is not yet 
the final index but only that of the firm. In order to find the final index, I calculated the 
mean of the indicators, for each group of questions, for the firms in the East and for the 
                                                 
9  This  index  would  also  have  to  include  the  cost  of  the  creation  of  new  market  institutions,  laws, 
governmental  agencies,  competition  authorities,  offices  for  consumer  protection,  etc.  However,  my 
questionnaire was administered only to firms and not to legislators, public offices and representatives of 
Government. Therefore, it could not capture this kind of cost.  
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firms  in  the  West  of  Poland.  Finally,  for  each  group  of  questions,  I  calculated  the 
weighted mean of the indexes weighting the means  1 X and  2 X for the firm population 
respectively in the East and West of Poland
10, obtaining the final six indexes for Poland 
(see footnote 11).  
To sum up, the final index, which embodies a relevant group of questions, is a weighted 
mean of the average of answers of all the firms, for each group of questions: in other 
words, the weighted mean of firms’ indicators.  
3.  Indexes of governance and of institutional quality  
My  indexes  range  from  1  to  5. They  reflect  the  “real  perception”  of  entrepreneurs 
expressed by answering the questions in a range between 1 and 5. However answers 
about productivity, employment and turnover represent the actual figure of firms. In 
fact I could check those answers against data available in the directory of the Polish 
Chamber  of  Commerce,  above  mentioned,  which  contains  information  about 
productivity, employment and turnover.  
 
The indexes, which are independent variables, should be interpreted as follows: 
 
The index “Support of Public Institutions” means that the greater the index is, (closer to 
5), the greater the support of public institutions is for the economic agents. 
 
The index “Adjustment to Formal Institutions” means that the greater the index is, the 
greater the adaptation of the entrepreneurs to formal economic institutions is. 
 
The index “Persistence of Informal Institutions” is a significant index. It implies that 
with the increase of the index, the influence of the rules and institutions of the old 
regime and the resistance to the change increases. This index measures the impact of the 
path dependency on the new institutions, persistence of old values, routines and habits. 
Moreover,  this  index  captures  the  persistence  of  old  lobbies  and  rent seeking.  The 
higher  the  index  is  the  worse  the  situation,  because  it  means  that  the  conflict  and 
inconsistency  between  old  and  new  institutions  are  significant.  In  that  case  the 
uncertainty increases and, hence, the transaction costs increase. 
 
The index “Legal System and property rights” measures the quality of the legal and 
judicial system, property rights and effectiveness of law, as judged by the economic 
agents. The quality improves with the increase of the index. 
 
The index “Trust” is simple but very important. It measures the level of confidence 
between economic agents and, more generally, the level of trust that economic agents 
have  for  the  Polish  economic  system.  The  higher  the  index,  the  better  (because  it 
implies more trust). 
 
The  index  “Extra Cost  Factor  and  Corruption”  is  a  complex  index  because  of  its 
definition, and because of the difficulty in capturing such concepts as bribes, corruption, 
bargaining transaction costs, and acquisition costs of new property rights (costs of the 
                                                 
10 Doing so I will avoid to weight the final index by firm size, sector, ownership export activity avoided   
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institutional transformation in situations of uncertainty). It increases with the increase of 
these costs. 
 
Productivity  is  a  dependent  variable.  However,  there  is  no  quantity  that  expresses 
productivity in absolute terms or its exact increase. There is, however, a value, extracted 
from the entrepreneurs' answers, which indicates that the productivity of the firm in the 
last two years (2001/2002) improved (2), decreased (0) or did not change (1). Hence, on 
the one hand it is easy to estimate the direction of the impact of the firms' indexes on 
their own productivity, in the sense that it is easy to observe how the  productivity 
changes  when  the  indexes  change.  On  the  other  hand  it  is  not  possible, 
methodologically, to estimate exactly the impact of the indexes on productivity and its 
level. In order to observe the impact of institutional indexes on the productivity change, 
I will use an ordered probit model which seems to be the most appropriate statistical 
tool, as my dependent variable (productivity change) can assume only three discrete 
values (0, 1 and 2). However, in order to verify the reliability of these “subjective” 
answers I will use also actual productivity data for each firm, withdrawn from the CD of 
the Chamber of Commerce. Then, I will correlate, through an OLS model, institutional 
indexes and actual productivity data. 
 
As  regards  a  definition  of  productivity,  the  entrepreneurs  should  consider  the 
relationship between the amount of output obtained and the number of inputs used in 
the production process.
11 Generally, the calculation for the firm is the following:  
 
 
bK aL
Q
P
+
=  
 
 
 where P (productivity) is equal to the relation between the product (Q) and all the 
inputs used. In the equation, I indicated the inputs with L and K, multiplied by the 
correspondent prices a and b. In order to have a more reliable answer I also asked for 
the turnover and the employment level of the firm, which relation can easily be linked to 
the  total  productivity  trend.  Finally,  I  tried  to  elicit  the  importance  of  the  informal 
economy  for  the  respondent  firms,  asking  a  direct  question  about  that,  to  which 
entrepreneurs could answer “yes, no, or partly” (see Table 7). In the following table I 
present the initial results of the indexes of governance and institutional quality obtained 
from the questionnaire:  
                                                 
11  Intentionally,  the  calculation  for  the  entrepreneurs  was  subjective  as  they  did  not  have  to  tackle 
theoretical and methodological problems relating to the measurement of inputs such as human capital, 
education etc.   
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Table 5 
INDEXES OF GOVERNANCE AND OF INSTITUTIONAL QUALITY 
  INDEXES 
EAST ( 1 X ) 
INDEXES 
 WEST ( 2 X ) 
INDEXES ( ) 
POLAND  
( Weighted 
12 ) 
SUPPORT  2.4292  2.8369  2.7766 
FORMAL INSTITUTIONS  2.9854  3.5327  3.4517 
INFORMAL INSTITUTIONS  a.5765  3.0052  3.0897 
TRUST  a.1844  3.5073  3.4595 
LEGAL System and Property 
Rights  2.4455  2.8109  2.7568 
EXTRA COST CORRUPTION  3.4229  1.9731  2.1877 
Source: Author’s calculation  
 
Moreover, I present data for other variables: productivity, employment and turnover. I 
have the percentage of firms whose productivity, employment and turnover in the last 
two years (2001/2002) increased (2), decreased (0), did not change (1).  
 
Table 6 
PRODUCTIVITY 2001 2002  EAST  WEST  POLAND 
% Improved (2)  47%  59%  57% 
% Decreased (0)  30%  11%  14% 
% Did not change (1)  23%   30%  29% 
EMPLOYMENT 2001 2002       
% Improved  23%  38%  35% 
% Decreased   29%  46%  44% 
% Did not change   47%  16%  21% 
TURNOVER 2001 2002       
% Improved  35%  46%  44% 
% Decreased  30%  34%  34% 
% Did not changed  35%  20%  23% 
Source: Author’s calculation  
 
Finally, the following table represents the percentages of Informal Economy obtained 
on the basis of a "direct answer” given by the firms to a specific question:
13 
                                                 
12 I calculated the final indexes of Poland weighting the indexes in the East and West for the effective 
population of firms in the East and the West. In particular, ) 76 . 0 ( ) 24 . 0 ( 2 1 × + × = X X m , where the 
two coefficients 0.24 and 0.76 represent the weights of the population of firms respectively in the East 
and West. They reflect the population of the firms in the East and the West, following the database of the 
Chamber of Commerce of Poland which I used.  1 X  and  2 X  are the indexes in the East and the West, 
that is the sample mean of the indicators of firms.  
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Table 7 
% INFORMAL 
ECONOMY 
14  EAST  WEST  POLAND 
Answer YES  35,5  54,2  52,5 
Answer PARTLY  39  29,5  30 
Answer NOT  25,5  16,3  17,5 
Tot. Respondents  100%  100%  100% 
Source: Author’s calculation  
 
The  next  issues  I  addressed  were:  1)  if  the  indexes  are  effectively  different  in  the 
population and not only in the sample, between the East and West of Poland; 2) why 
the indexes between the East and West of Poland may be so different; and, 3) if this 
diversity has a different impact on the economic performance of the regions.  
4.   Statistic diversity between East and West Poland’s Indexes: hypothesis 
test 
In order to answer the first question mentioned above a statistical tool will be used to 
give statistical significance to the information about population and not only to the 
information about the sample.  
The sample analysis shows that East and West indexes are very different. However, in 
order to test the 6th Hypothesis I had to test whether the indexes are also different in 
the population. Hence, I made a test of a difference between means in a population with 
unknown variances (S) but supposed equal, on two samples (the East and West) whose 
distributions (N1 = 18; and N2 = 73) are approximately normal. The test statistic is: 
 
) / 1 ( ) / 1 (
'
2 1
2 1
n n S
X X
t
test Statistic
p +
-
=
-
                                                                                                                                          
13 The question, in the English version of the questionnaire, was: “Does your company declare all year’s 
turnover to relevant authorities (Tax Office)”? The possible answers were: Yes; Partly; No. (In Polish: 
“Czy  Pani/Pańskie  przedsiębiorstwo  deklarowało  urzędowi  podatkowemu  całoroczny  obrót?”Tak; 
Częściowo; Nie).  
14 Informal Economy, in this case, means everything that has a legal market but which is produced in an 
illegal way (tax evasion, non respect of law, illegal work, etc.). One can notice from the chart a higher 
level of informal economy in the East, according to the different answers, i.e.: “Not”, "my company 
does not declare all year’s turnover" (25% in the East, 16,3% in the West); “Yes” it does (35,5%; in the 
East, 54,2% in the West). Interestingly enough, the aggregate data for Poland of the answer “Not” 
(17,5%), which represents for us the most reliable level of informal economy, is very close to the one 
estimate by Kaufmann et al (1997), who found out a level of informal economy between 15% and 20%, 
using an energy consumption methodology. 
  
 
Pasquale Tridico, Institutional Change and Governance Indexes in Transition Economies 
 
 
Available online at http://eaces.liuc.it 
209 
            Figure 1. INDEXES OF GOVERNANCE
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Source: Author’s calculation 
 
The results of t' for each index according to that formula are:
15 
  
Support  Formal  Informal  Trust  Legal.P.R  Extra Cos. 
Corruption 
3.014398  5.56305   4.81082  2.482988  2.492641   9.79256 
 
Under the hypothesis of normality of the population distribution, t' approximates a 
Student’s t distribution with (n1+n2) 2 degree of freedom (d.o.f.), like this:  
. . . ) 2 ( 2 1 f o d t n n = - + a  
 
Hence, after making the relevant calculations, the results show a statistical diversity: 
    Support  Formal  Informal  Trust  Legal.P.R 
Extra 
Cost  
Corruption
P(t'>tα)=α    t' > t α  t' >t α  t' < t α  t' > t α  t'> t α  t' < t α 
with α=0.01 
t α (89) 
dof =  2.358  2.358   2.358  2.358  2.358   2.358 
H0: E= O               
H1: O> E        H1: O< E      H1:  O< E 
Reject H0 because t’ 
tα yields the 
following difference: 
  0.656398  3.20505   2.45282  0.124988  0.134641   7.43456 
 
                                                 
15 The results have been gained through the formula of a statistic test t' presented above. In particular, X1 
and X2 are the sample means, that is, the indexes, for each group; n1 and n2 are the observations, and S is 
the variance in the sample distributions.  
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To put it differently, given a very small α, H0 ( E= O) is rejected if the quantity t' is in 
the  rejection  region  and  the  alternative  hypothesis  H1  ( O> E)  is  accepted.  The 
rejection region is R={t': t' ≥ tα}, with P (t’ ≥ tα)=α (meaning, with an α=0.01 level of 
significance). Alternatively, if the quantity t' is negative the rejection region is R={t:  t’ ≤ 
tα} with P(t’ ≤  tα)=α (meaning, with an α=0.01 level of significance).  
In all the cases we reject H0 (the null hypothesis that subtends the equality of the two 
amounts t' and tα). In other words we reject the hypothesis according to which the 
mean in the East ( E) is equal to the mean in the West ( E= O) and, instead, we 
accept the hypothesis that in the population the mean in the West is greater than in the 
East  ( O> E)  in  all  cases  except  for  the  indexes  "Informal"  and  "Extra cost 
Corruption"  which  on  the  contrary  is   O< E,  as  I  expected.  All  this  confirms 
Hypothesis 6.  
5.  Initial results about indexes and the productivity: χ² analysis  
The  analysis  responses  confirm  a  strong  correlation  between  the  six  indexes  and 
productivity.  The  coefficients  are  statistically  significant.  I  tested  the  relationship 
through the analysis of χ² (Chi square). First of all, I built the contingency tables 
16 for 
each index with "productivity". Then, I tested if:  
H0  =  Productivity  and  the  indexes  (Formal/Support/Legal/Informal/Extra Cost 
Corruption/Trust) are not correlated. Or: 
H1  =  Productivity  and  indexes  (Formal/Support/Legal/Informal/Extra Cost 
Corruption/Trust) are correlated. 
I  started  testing  the  relationship  between  the  Productivity  variable  and  the  index 
Support. I present a contingency table from which I withdraw the χ ² equation testing 
the relationship between the variables.  
 
Table 8. Productivity/Support 
Productivity  Classes of 
Indexes Support  D=0  D.n.C=1  I=2  Total 
1.5 2  5  3  2  10 
2 2.5  1  3  9  13 
2.5 3  6  16  18  40 
3 3.5  0  5  19  24 
3.5 4  0  0  4  4 
Total  12  27  52  91 
 
By calculating the marginal distribution from the Table 8 I found out the test statistic, 
which is:  
   ( )
∑∑
-
=
ij
ij ij
c
c n
X
2
) 2 = X²≈ χ² with (k 1) • (t 1) degrees of freedom (dof).  
 
                                                 
16 In the columns there are the classes of indexes, and in the rows there is the trend of productivity as 
usual for the years 2001/2002: 0 =Decreased; 1=Did not change; 2=Improved.   
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Based on the information in the table, I found out  ij n  and  ij c . The first represents all 
the elements within the table.
17 The second is given by multiplying partial totals of rows 
and columns and by dividing the product for the total (91). The greater χ², the greater 
the probability that the null hypothesis (H0= not correlation between variables) 
18 is 
false.  
In the case of correlation between Productivity and Support, χ² is equal to 25.067. From 
the table of χ² distribution one can easily observe that the value of χ² with 8 degrees of 
freedom
19 is in the  rejection region, well beyond the acceptance region with a high 
probability, P(χ² ≥ 25.06), and with α = 0.005. In fact, we reject H0, which is not 
statistically significant at the 0.005 level. That means that Productivity and Support are 
strongly correlated (H1 is true). In fact, the contingency table above shows that when 
there is a lower Support index (classes: 1.5 2 and 2 2.5) the productivity tends to be 0 or 
1; while when the index increases, the productivity tends to be 2 (meaning that firms 
with a higher index of support have a higher productivity). The economic meaning of 
this is that the firms that get insufficient support of public institutions have a lower 
productivity (or to be more precise, have a productivity, with a decreasing trend, in the 
last two years), while the ones that get that support seem to have higher productivity 
(increasing trend). On the contrary, the firms that declare a greater support of public 
institutions have a productivity with an increasing trend in the last two years. Below I 
present  the  results  of  χ²  analyses  withdrawn  from  contingency  tables.  However, 
contingency tables from the other 5 indexes are omitted.  
 
Table 9 χ² analysis of contingency tables between Productivity and the indexes 
                                                 
17 The order is the following: first row, first column, first row, second column, etc. … second row, first 
column, second row, second column, etc. … in the table we would have: 5, 3, 2, 1, 3, 9, 6, 16 etc. 
18  In  fact  a  χ²  value  above  15/20  allows  for  rejection  of  the  null  hypothesis,  with  a  high  level  of 
probability. 
19 From the composition of the table one can see that the degrees of freedom are 8 because k (that is the 
number of the classes of indexes) = 5, and t (the possible answers for productivity, 0, 1,2) = 3, hence (5 
1)(3 1)=8. 
Indexes  χ²  dof 
Level of 
significance 
α 
H0, null 
hypothesis 
(no correlation ) 
H1, 
alternative 
hypothesis 
(correlation ) 
Index Support 
/productivity  25.06  10  0.005  Rejected  Accepted 
Index 
Formal/productivity  32  10  0.001  Rejected   Accepted 
Index 
Trust/productivity  63.3  4  0.0001  Rejected   Accepted 
Index 
Legal/productivity  20.08  10  0.025  Rejected   Accepted 
Index 
ExtraCost/productivit  17.27  12  0.1  Rejected   Accepted 
Index 
Informal/productivity  18.49  10  0.05  Rejected   Accepted  
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To sum up, the χ² analysis confirms a strong correlation (hence not a casual relation) 
between the variable productivity and the indexes. Throughout the contingency tables I 
verified that the null hypothesis on independency between variables is false and I always 
accepted  the  alternative hypothesis  of  correlation between  productivity  and  indexes. 
Hence my hypotheses seem be confirmed. The next step now is to run an ordered 
probit model between those variables in order to calculate the impact of the variables on 
productivity.  
6.  Ordered probit model analysis  
The most appropriate statistical tool that we can use with the data available in order to 
test correlation between indexes (as independent variables in a range between 1 5) and 
productivity (as independent variables) is an ordered probit model, which measures the 
impact of qualitative data on a restricted number of discrete values (in my case: 0, 1 and 
2 as the measure of productivity trend, respectively decreased, unchanged, increased) 
obtained from the questionnaire.  
 
Table 10 
Pseudo R²=0.658409; Asterisks denote significance levels: * at 1%; ** at 5%; *** at 10%. 
Source: Author’s calculation 
 
The ordered model analysis shows very clear results as regards a direction of the impact 
of the indexes on productivity. The estimator used is robust towards heteroskedasticity 
variance problems.
20 What is important in this analysis are the signs of the coefficients 
which indicate the direction of the relationship between change of productivity and the 
indexes, and not the level of productivity.
21 
The results of the model show a positive relationship between productivity and the four 
indexes (in order of magnitude of coefficients, i.e.: Trust, Support, Legal and Formal), 
                                                 
20 Some tests carried out through the statistical econometric program EViews confirm that. 
21 The sign of  i b  (coefficients) shows the direction of the change in the probability of the dependent 
variable (in my case y=0 or y=2) falling in the endpoint rankings (0, M) when  i x (the indexes) changes. 
Pr(y=0) changes in the opposite direction of the sign of  i b  and Pr(y=2) changes in the same direction as 
the  sign  of  i b   (Greene  1997).  Pr(y=1)  can  change  in  both  directions  of  i b .The  effects  on  the 
probability  of  falling  within  any  of  the  middle  rankings  (k)  are  given 
by:
j
k
j
k
j
x F x F k y
b
b g
b
b g
b ¶
- ¶
-
¶
- ¶
=
¶
= ¶ + ) ( ) ( ) Pr(
' '
1  for K=1,…,M-1 ( in my case is just 1) and k g  is the limit 
point of the dependent variable. 
Dependent Variable: Productivity change 
Method: ML   Ordered Probit 
Included observations: 91; (no. of ordered indicator values: 3 i.e.: 0, 1, 2) 
IDEXES   Coefficients  Std. Error  P>|z|  Significance 
Informal   1.499169  0.640857  0.0193  ** 
Trust  3.866324  0.922648  0.0000  * 
Extra Cost Corruption   0.461726  0.309254  0.1054  *** 
Formal  0.114677  0.735899  0.8762    
Support  0.866745  0.533818  0.1044  *** 
Legality Property Rights  0.597882  0.531395  0.2605     
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while  the  relationship  is  negative  between  the  productivity  and  the  Informal  and 
Corruption indexes. All the indexes, except for Legal and Formal, are significant at 1%, 
5% or 10% level; moreover the Pseudo R², which tells us about the explanatory power 
of variables, is quite important. 
In general, we can therefore state that the bigger the indexes Formal, Support, Trust and 
Legal are, the more the firms that have an increasing productivity trend are. At the same 
time the greater the indexes Informal and Extra Cost and Corruption are, the more the 
firms that have a decreasing productivity trend are. Consequently, in order to increase 
the  productivity  it  would  be  necessary  to  have  higher  values  of  the  four  indexes 
(Support, Formal, Trust and Legal) and smaller values of the 2 indexes (Informal and 
Extra Cost Corruption). The results confirm my first group of hypotheses (H.1, H.2, 
H.3, H.4, e H.5). Interestingly the magnitude of Trust coefficient is very consistent. Its 
impact on productivity change seems to be very important confirming several research 
studies in such field (among others Raiser et al. 2001; Kornai et al. 2004). 
The extensive form of the equation explaining the model would be the following:
22 
 
Productivity  =   1.49*Index  Informal  +  3.86*Index  Trust     0.46*Index  Extra  + 
0.86*Index Support 
 
In particular there is a negative relationship between the Productivity and the Informal 
Institution  index  which  captures  a  part  of  informal  institutions.  That  is,  with  the 
increase of the presence and persistence of informal rules, habits and old values of the 
previous planned economy system, privileges, old lobbies and rent seeking, productivity 
tends to drop (both in the East and in the West of Poland). It is important to add that 
this negative relationship concerns only a part of informal institutions. In particular it is 
referred  to  those  informal  institutions  which  are  in  contrast  with  the  formal  rules 
imposed by the new institutions of the market economy.
23 In other words, only if there 
is dissonance in the behavioural models of the agents does there seem to be a negative 
effect on the productivity. I will give an example: the informal index of State Enterprises 
(SOE)  is  higher  than  the  private  enterprises'  informal  index,  but  their  economic 
performance in terms of productivity is better. This confirms a thesis of Saul Estrin 
(1996).  According  to  Estrin  there  is  no  significant  evidence  that  during  the  1990’s 
private firms performed better than SOE. In the first case, the labour and managerial 
organization  of  the  firms  did  not  change  so  much,  hence  it  is  very  similar  to  the 
previous  organization  of  socialist  type  (subsidies,  soft  budget  constraints,  trade 
protection,  privileges,  etc.).  In  the  second  case,  the  private  firms  underwent  a 
restructuring process. At present they do not have privileges and subsidies, they have 
built new lobbies and they cope with more formal, and hard constraints (competition, 
trade  opening,  harmonization  to  EU  law).  The  following  Table  11  illustrates  the 
problem. 
 
 
Table 11. Productivity trend by ownership of the firms 
PRODUCTIVITY  Total composition 
                                                 
22 The variables Formal and Legal are not presented in the equation because they are statistically not 
significant. 
23 On the contrary, the relationship between productivity and the other part of informal institutions, 
captured by the index “Trust” is strongly positive.  
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 Type of ownership  0 
(decreased) 
1 
(did not change) 
2 
(increased) 
of the sample  
by ownership (%) 
Cooperative  29%  29%  42%  15% 
Foreign (FDI)  0%  38%  62%  15% 
Private  20%  30%  50%  43% 
State owned (SOE)  7%  26%  67%  27% 
Total number of firms (%)  14%  31%  55%  100% 
Source: Author’s calculation 
7.  The East West dualism captured by the governance indexes 
The diversity of the indexes of governance between the East and the West represents a 
well known phenomenon in Poland, the dualism between the East and the West. Similar 
to Italy’s North South dualism, the Polish dualism is revealed by strong differences in 
the  GDP  per capita,  poverty,  education  levels,  unemployment  and  deficiencies  of 
infrastructures in the East when compared with the West (Walsh 2000). Moreover, the 
East remains traditionally agricultural and rural while the West is more industrialized 
and urbanized. Finally, the size of the informal economy in the East is greater than in 
the West. In short, the East is poorer and economically less developed than the West as 
in  the  North South  Italian  dualism.  Fadda  (1999,  pp.  99 100)  lists  four  institutional 
categories through which he explains the fundamental differences in the processes of 
growth between the North and the South of Italy. They are the following:  
Property Rights system;  
The system of prizes and penalties;  
The category of "rent seeking";  
Relations of Trust. 
These four categories are present in my analysis and are captured by my six indexes of 
governance, in particular, the indexes: Trust, Extra Cost Corruption, and legality. The 
empirical results seem to confirm Fadda’s thesis (1999). In particular, the differentials 
between indexes are evidence of strong differences in the economic institutions of these 
two macro regions.  
My indexes showed that, apart from the pure economic differences between eastern and 
western Poland, the formal and informal institutions of the East and the West are very 
different. There is a different perception of legality and property rights. The systems of 
incentives, prizes and penalties are very different. The relations of trust and the certainty 
of economic relations are less strong in the East than in the West. The values and the 
habits (captured by the index "Persistence of Informal Institutions") are different. In 
particular, lobbying and rent seeking activities, resistance towards new market rules and 
new formal institutions such as agencies, Chambers of Commerce, organizations, laws, 
trade codes, etc., seem to be much stronger. The acceptance of new formal rules and 
EU norms are more difficult in the East than in the West. A sort of inertia (captured by 
the index "Adjustment to the formal institutions") seems to be present in the East and 
much less in the West. At the same time, the lack of support from the administration 
and  public  institutions  and  the  difficulties  created  by  the  bureaucracy  are  mainly 
perceived in the East. Finally, in the East corruption, bribes, and other unofficial costs 
(Index "Extra Cost and Corruption") and inertia in the new distribution of the property 
rights seem to be more widely spread in comparison with the West of Poland.   
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Therefore the  system of incentives and penalties is biased. A perverse  system, with 
inefficient benefits rather than collective and more productive aims, seems to prevail. 
Moreover, the differences in the business environment, the legality, the rule of law, the 
supremacy of contracts, seem to confirm the split between the East and the West. In 
fact, the Legal index captures a very different environment between the East and the 
West, which describes the East environment closer to the former Soviet Republics or to 
the environment of Romania and Bulgaria, as described by other institutional indexes 
(such as "Rule of Law" in Kaufmann et al. 2003; “Legal Indicator Survey”, in Transition 
Report 2001). 
Finally,  as  regards  informal  institutions,  and  in  particular,  relations  of  trust,  loyalty, 
behavioural norms, cooperation, respect, certainty of economic relations, and in a wider 
meaning, "Trust", they seem to be a mirror of the intensity of economic relations, the 
intensity of economic exchanges, the certainty of property rights, the self reinforcement 
of rules and contracts, and information and knowledge flow. For better performance, an 
economic system needs all these elements (Putnam 1993). Therefore, the differences in 
these qualities can create strong differences in the productivity and the output of a 
country (Olson 1982). Hence, in the two sub systems which I analysed, the East and 
West of Poland, the differences in this sense, as underlined by the index “Trust”, are 
significant and seem to cause strong differences in the economic performances of the 
two macro regions of Poland. Now my aim is to prove that the differences between the 
East and West governance indexes, i.e. the diversity of economic institutions, cause 
differences in firm’s productivity and a productivity gap. 
7.1  Implications  of  governance  index  differentials  for  the  East West 
Polish dualism 
Jones and Hall (1998) showed that the differences of output between countries are 
mainly explained by differences in the "Social Infrastructure", that is, the difference 
caused by the economic institutions. Similarly, Olson et al. (1998) explains differences in 
the GDP per capita between rich and poor countries on the basis of their economic 
institutions.
24 
Recently, Bardhan (2005) suggested that some institutional index such as participatory 
rights and democratic accountability are better explaining variables of development than 
other such as property right institutions. While according to Rodrik and Rigobon (2005), 
who explain income gaps among countries, democracy and the rule of law are both 
good for economic performance. The debate is very vibrant and of course the opinions 
can be divergent and common grounds are difficult to share (see Glaeser et al., 2004; 
Albouy 2005).
25  
Likewise, I have used the ordered probit analysis in order to test whether (and which) 
better economic institutions, captured by higher governance indexes in the West of 
Poland, have a more important impact on the productivity change of the sampled firms 
                                                 
24 In particular Olson et al (1998) elaborated some indexes in order to evaluate the impact on the output 
of the different countries. The indexes are: The Risk of Expropriation; The Risk of Repudiation of Contracts by 
Governments; Quality of Bureaucracy; Level of Corruption ; Law and Order Tradition; International Country Risk. 
25 However some economic evidence (i.e. differences between North and South American long term 
development path, Asian tigers development, African persistent underdevelopment) and many of the 
most important economists (such as Kuznets 1965; Sen 1981; Hirschman, 1990; North 1990; Rodrik 
2004) seem to suggest that institutions play a crucial role in economic development as an important spin 
off for institutional change and therefore to improve productivity performance.  
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than in the East. As regards the western sample I related all the indexes together with 
productivity values (0,1,2), hence I obtained only one Pseudo R² for all the regressors, 
while in the case of the eastern sample, I related each regressor separately with the 
dependent variable, obtaining several Pseudo R².
26 
 
Table 12 
Dependent Variable: Productivity change 
Method: ML   Ordered Probit 
  WEST  EAST 
 
Included observations: 73; (no. 
of ordered indicator values: 3, 
i.e.: 0, 1, 2) 
Included observations: 18; (no. 
of ordered indicator values: 3, 
i.e.: 0, 1, 2) 
  Pseudo R²=0.739726    Pseudo R² for 
each variable 
INFORMAL  Coefficients   2.920771   4.122680  0.441157 
  Std. Error  1.149282  1.574292   
  P>|z|  0.0110**  0.0088*   
TRUST  Coefficient  3.721244  1.158132  0.128594 
  Std. Error  1.214670  0.550383   
  P>|z|  0.0022*  0.0354**   
EXTRA  Coefficient   0.181915   1.049240  0.102215 
  Std. Error  0.514563  0.541513   
  P>|z|  0.7237  0.0527***   
FORMAL  Coefficient  1.246558  0.837632  0.400749 
  Std. Error  1.345582  0.500183   
  P>|z|  0.3542  0.0940***   
SUPPORT  Coefficient  1.392443  0.883283  0.255559 
  Std. Error  0.845420  0.542754   
  P>|z|  0.0995***  0.1037***   
LEGAL  Coefficient  1.202862  0.602379  0.176171 
  Std. Error  0.797532  0.367126   
  P>|z|  0.1015***  0.1008***   
Significance levels: * at 1%; ** at 5%; *** at 10%. 
 
The results are very interesting: all the coefficients of the variables have the expected 
signs, both in the East and in the West. The direction of the impact on productivity 
change seems to be the same in the East and in the West as well as for the whole sample 
(cf. table 10 and table 12). In particular the relationship is negative between productivity 
change  and  the  index  Extra  Cost Corruption.  This  means  that  with  the  increase  in 
corruption, bribes and other illegal costs (i.e. bargaining transaction costs, and in general 
extra transaction costs) the firms having worse productivity performances increase. The 
                                                 
 26 The reason for this is that I had fewer observations for the eastern sample (only 18). Consequently the 
Pseudo R² is quite low for each variable. However the p values are significant within a 10% level. On 
the contrary for the western sample I have a very consistent Pseudo R².  
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same negative relationship is with the “informal” index. Again there is a very strong 
positive  correlation  with  the  trust  index.  The  “formal”  institutions  captured  by  the 
indexes  Support,  Formal,  and  Legal  have  a  positive  impact  on  firms’  productivity 
change. Again, my hypotheses (H.1, H.2, H.3, H.4, H.5) are confirmed. Hence, the 
empirical  analysis  has  confirmed  theoretical  predictions,  i.e.:  for  the  residual  part, 
productivity  seems  to  be  determined  by  economic  institutions  as  captured  by  my 
governance indexes. In other words, the economic institutions of a country   from the 
very basic ones, (such as: the public administration, the organizations, the governmental 
agencies which may support production, exchange, and information processes), to more 
complex ones (such as: interaction between economic agents, networks, cooperation, 
exchange  of  knowledge,  industrial  relations,  negotiations)     are  essential  for  the 
economic development.  
Obviously the magnitude of the coefficients is different between East and West. Very 
interestingly, the results suggest that negative correlated coefficients (for the indexes 
Extra Cost Corruption and Informal), have a bigger impact in the East than in the West, 
while positive correlated coefficients (for the indexes Trust, Support, Formal and Legal) 
have a bigger impact in the West. In my model, this is on the basis of a productivity gap 
between East and West. That is, the impact of indexes of governance on productivity is 
greater  in  the  West  than  in  the  East,  meaning  that  the  indexes  (and  therefore  the 
economic institutions) should lead   under the same conditions of technology, labour 
and capital not included in this analysis   to a greater level of productivity in the West 
than in the East.  
Since the indexes’ differentials between the East and West of Poland are very consistent 
and  statistically  significant,  they  may  cause  the  productivity  differentials.  This  result 
would confirm my last hypothesis (H7).  
 
Table 13 
Indexes   West     East  Differentials 
Trust  3.507275  >  3.184386  0.322889 
Formal Instit.  3.532741  >  2.985364  0.547377 
Legal Sis. P.R.  2.810894  >  2.445476  0.365418 
Informal Inst.  3.005197  <  3.576474   0.57128 
Extracost Corruption  1.973116  <  3.422863   1.44975 
 
So  far,  the  analysis  dealt  with  subjective  answers  of  the  respondents  concerning 
productivity movements and institutional matters. In order to give more consistency to 
my analysis and to see whether the responses of the interviewed agents correspond to 
the reality I used also actual productivity data (i.e. Output/workers)
27. I correlated them 
with the same institutional indexes presented above (as independent variables). In this 
                                                 
27 In the questionnaire I asked also quantitative information about actual annual sales and number of 
employees (see the questionnaire in appendix).  Almost all  the respondents gave those information. 
When those data were not available I found them in the CD of the Chamber of Commerce of Poland 
which I used to sample the firms. However, I observed a complete consistency between quantitative 
answers of the firms and the data available in the CD.  
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case, obviously, I did not use an ordered probit model but a multiple OLS regression 
model. The dependent variable is the logarithm of the Output per worker. Below I 
present the results. 
 
Table 14 
Dependent Variable: LOG(ACTUAL PRODUCTIVITY) 
Method: Least Squares 
Included observations: 91 
Variable  Coefficient  Std. Error  Prob.  
EXTRACOSTCORRUP   0.190743  0.120798  0.1008** 
INFORMAL   0.107024  0.203660  0.6006 
SUPPORT  0.036427  0.157411  0.8175 
TRUST  1.045485  0.220602  0.0000* 
C  8.859320  1.321691  0.0000* 
R squared  0.503755  Mean dependent var   11.93158 
Adjusted R squared  0.480674  S.D. dependent var   0.849661 
S.E. of regression  0.612302  Akaike info criterion   1.910197 
Sum squared resid  32.24262  Schwarz criterion   2.048156 
Log likelihood   81.91395  F statistic   21.82535 
Durbin Watson stat  1.328476  Prob(F statistic)   0.000000 
Source: Author’s calculation. * = Significance level at 1%; ** at 10%. 
 
To some extent, the OLS model confirms the ordered probit results. The signs of the 
coefficients confirm my main hypothesis, i.e. the indexes Informal and the index Extra 
cost have a negative impact on actual productivity, while Support and Trust have a 
positive  impact.  However,  not  all  the  indexes  are  statistically  significant.  Moreover, 
similarly to the results of Bardhan (2005), 2 indexes (i.e., Legal and Formal) are not 
included in this regression because they lower the R squared which as it is presented 
now is quite high. Finally the indexes Trust seems to be strongly correlated also with 
actual productivity as the scatter of the simple regression model below shows.  
These relationships are valid both in the East and in the West of Poland. In the East, a 
lower index of Trust and a higher index of Extra Cost and Corruption would cause a 
lower output per worker than in the West. In the East productivity and GDP per capita 
are  lower  than  in  the West  (Gorzelak,  1999). The  respondents  to  my  questionnaire 
confirmed this pattern. Average output per worker of the respondent firms in the East 
is 120523 Polish Zloty while in the West is almost twice, 222775 Polish Zloty.   
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Figure 2 
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However, I have to specify that Poland differs along many important dimensions that 
might be correlated with both institutional and economic performances. East and West 
of  Poland  had  different  historical  experiences  until  the  creation  of  modern  Poland, 
different industrialization policies during communism as well as a different distance and 
cultural  affinity  to  Western  Europe.  A  reverse  causality  problem  could  exist.  The 
productivity gap between East and West may be an effect but at the same time may be 
one of the original causes of poorer institutions in the East, as lower productivity leads 
to lower output and lower output brings fewer resources and little financial means to 
spend in order to foster better institutions such as public services, the legal system, 
social policies, etc. In order to solve this problem a “Granger” causality test was carried 
out. 
The test excludes a reverse causality relation between productivity and the index Extra 
cost and between productivity and the index Informal (i.e., while the indexes Extra Cost 
and Informal affect productivity, the reverse is not true). As regards the indexes Trust 
and Support, a reverse causality problem cannot be excluded, and this is not surprising.
28 
In particular, the index Trust, in my survey, is an expression also of the general business 
environment, which can be strongly affected by the trend of the productivity. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
28 However the probability that Trust and Support do not granger cause Productivity is lower than the 
reverse.  
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Table 15 
Pairwise Granger Causality Tests on the regression presented in table 14 
Included Observation 91 
Lags: 2 
Null Hypothesis:  Act 
Obs 
F Statistic  Probability 
Extra cost does not Granger Cause 
Log(Actual_Prod)  89  0.64583  0.52681 
Log(Actual_Prod) does not Granger Cause Extra 
cost*    1.95684  0.10252* 
Informal does not Granger Cause 
Log(Actual_Prod)  89  0.20155  0.81786 
Log(Actual_Prod) does not Granger Cause 
Informal*    2.37423  0.09931* 
Trust does not Granger Cause Log(Actual_Prod)  89  0.95697  0.38820 
Log(Actual_Prod) does not Granger Cause Trust    1.22523  0.29888 
Support does not Granger Cause 
Log(Actual_Prod)  89  0.38990  0.67835 
Log(Actual_Prod)  does  not  Granger  Cause 
Support    0.58902  0.55714 
Asterisks denote the acceptable causality hypothesis. 
Source: Author’s calculation 
 
 
However, a relevant literature seems to stress the importance and the priority of the 
causality direction adopted also in this paper 
29, i.e. Trust ￿ productivity, and in general, 
INSTITUTIONS  ￿  productivity  (Arrow  1975),  or,  as  Jones  and  Hall  (1998,  p.25) 
pointed out: 
 
Social Infrastructure ￿ (Input, Productivity) ￿ Output per capita 
 
What  is  important,  and  this  was  the  main  aim  of  my  paper,  is  to  capture  relevant 
INSTITUTIONS affecting performances, which can be different among countries and 
regions, and which can explain, better than other variables, economic development, as 
Bardhan (2005) also stressed.  
8.  Conclusion 
In this paper, I analysed, through a business survey in Poland, how firms’ productivity, 
which  is  a  dependent  variable,  changes  when  the  governance  indexes  change.  The 
                                                 
29 Olson et al. (1998) found that governance variables explain around 50% of growth rate changes among 
countries. Rodrik (1999) explains better economic performances of countries after the Second World 
War in terms of more appropriate social institutions. Finally Robinson et al. (2001) proved that different 
European  colonization  strategies  provided  exogenous  institutions  which  impacted  consistently  on 
productivity and on differences in income per capita among many developing countries.  
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indexes are independent variables built from a questionnaire administered to a selected 
sample of Polish firms. I used an ordered probit model. As I expected, I have found 
that  there  is  a  negative  relationship  between  the  productivity  and  two  indexes: 
Persistence of Informal Institutions and Extra Cost Corruption. On the contrary, there 
is  a  positive  relation  between  productivity  and  four  other  indexes:  Trust,  Formal 
Institutions, Legal System Property Right and Support of Public Institutions.  
The  indexes’  differentials  and  the  consequent  different  impact  on  the  productivity 
change  show  a  strong  difference  between  the  East  and  the  West  of  Poland.  The 
informal institutions such as: trust relations, loyalty, the tendency to cooperate between 
economic  agents,  and  other  "immaterial  factors"  called  in  a  broader  sense  “social 
capital” impact significantly on productivity. In fact, these factors eliminate or reduce 
problems due to phenomena of adverse selection and moral hazard, lack of information, 
uncertainty, rent seeking and free riding (or opportunism). An higher level of trust may 
cause an increase in investment and in productivity (Keynes 1936), an improvement in 
economic relations (Arrow 1975), an overcoming of risk (Olson 1982), the promotion 
of social interactions and, therefore, the creation of networks that allow for the flow of 
knowledge,  the  exchange  of  information,  the  cooperation  between  agents  and  the 
creation of more productive industrial areas (or districts). 
30 
 Trust, as social capital, is a non economic source of good economic performances. All 
the social values and norms that impose respect, common acceptance of certain rules 
and principles, cooperation, the conviction of the honesty and the reliability of other 
agents, the respect of rules and agreements, the conviction that the another agent would 
not  cause  damage,  have  a  very  positive  effect  on  productivity.  They  stimulate 
cooperation  processes,  increase  exchanges  and  the  intensity  of  economic  relations, 
stimulate sharing of technologies and knowledge, reduce information asymmetries, and 
reduce transaction costs with a great advantage for productivity. This resource seems to 
be much more consistent in the West than in the East of Poland. 
In  the  context  of  institutional  economics  literature,  I  have  come  up  with  several 
conclusions.  Like  Jones  and  Hall  (1998)  and  Olson  et  al.  (1998),  I  found  that  the 
difference between GDP levels is only partially explained by physical and human capital. 
“Residual” productivity makes the difference between the output of countries. Residual 
productivity seems to be caused by economic institutions which in the analysis of Jones 
and Hall (1998) are called “Social infrastructure” and in my analysis are captured by the 
indexes of governance. Hence, the difference between economic institutions explains 
the main difference between countries in terms of the GDP (Jones and Hall, 1998; 
Olson et al. 1998). In my case study, I found that the differences of governance indexes 
between the East and West of Poland seem to explain the main economic differences 
between  the  western  and  eastern  parts  of  the  country.  In  order  to  improve  the 
consistency of the relations which I found with the ordered probit model, I have also 
correlated,  through  an  OLS  model,  the  indexes  with  actual  productivity  data 
(output/workers). The results are very similar to the previous with subjective data. Some 
causality tests exclude reverse causation problems between productivity and the index 
Extra cost and between productivity and the index Informal, while reverse causation 
problems cannot be completely excluded with the indexes Trust and Support. Similarly 
                                                 
30  The  case  of  the  Italian  Industrial  Districts  is  a  good  example  which  proves  the  direction  of  the 
relationship (­ trust and then ­ productivity) (Becattini 1979). Moreover there is a growing literature 
focusing on social capital in transition economies confirming that thesis (see Raiser 1997; Raiser et al. 
2001; Kornai et al. 2004; etc.)  
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to the results of Bardhan (2005), the Index Legal Property right and the index Formal 
do not seem to be statistically good explaining variables of actual productivity data.  
Finally, I have in some respects improved the indexes proposed by other institutional 
economists, trying to capture relevant institutions. Firstly, some of those indexes seem 
to pay little attention to the institutional change in transition economies (except for the 
EBRD indexes). Secondly, they neglect the dimension of informal institutions. Thirdly, 
they have data at a national level and not at a regional level. Conversely, all of those 
elements are included in the indexes I proposed, and to some extent, the particular East 
West Polish dualism was captured by my institutional indexes. However, understanding 
the role of institutions in economic development is an extremely important area of 
research and more empirical evidence on understanding this relationship is certainly 
needed.  
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APPENDIX 
QUESTIONNAIRE (English version)  
 
 
 
PRELIMINARY QUESTIONS about the nature of the Company: 
 
 
A 
Name of Company: 
Location of Headquarters in Poland: 
 
Region:  
Production Location (if different): 
How many Owners: 
or diffused control of Shareholders:  YES  NO 
or concentrated control of Shareholders  YES  NO 
Annual sales 2002, in Zloty (if available) 
 
Year of creation: 
 
 
 
 
CHOOSE THE RELEVANT ANSWERS WITH X 
 
B 
Sector of Production (please indicate the specific goods or services if applicable): 
 a) Agriculture:  
 b) Manufacturing industry: 
 c) Service Sector/retail:  
 
C 
About our Respondent 
Is the respondent 
a) Manager/director 
b) Owner 
c) other (please indicate the specific title) 
 
Level of Education :  
a) MA (or equivalent) 
b) Postgraduate education  
c) BA(or equivalent) 
d) secondary school   
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e) primary school 
f) other (please indicate) 
 
D 
 Size: Please indicate the number of employees. 
 a) SME (Small or Medium Size Enterprise):if 250 or less employees. N… 
 b) LE (Large Enterprise): if more than 250 employees. N… 
 
E 
 Ownership: (if ownership is mixed please indicate the percentage of state and 
private sector involvement, if available)  
a) 100% State Owned Enterprise (SOE) 
b) Mixed  Ownership % of State…  Ownership % of Private………… 
c) Municipal company 
d) 100% Private Ownership 
e) Cooperatives  
f) Other (such as:) 
 
F 
Composition: (if the company receives both foreign and Polish investment, 
please indicate the % of each, if available) 
a) 100% Foreign direct investment (FDI)  
b) Mix.  Foreign Ownership % ………  Polish Ownership % ……  
c) 100% Polish Ownership 
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G  
Other information: 
 a) Company listed on the Stock Exchange  YES  NO  
 b) Former SOE (or municipal company)  YES  NO  
If the company was previously SOE (or municipal),  
please indicate if it changed the kind of production:  
 Former Production:  Actual Production: 
 c) Completely New Enterprise (set up after 
1989) 
YES  NO 
 d) Always private Enterprise (set up before 
1989) 
YES  NO 
 
H 
If the enterprise was privatised after 1989, what method of privatisation has it 
experienced?  
a)  MBOs (Management buy outs) 
b)  EBOs (Employee buy outs) 
c)  Sale to outsiders (other Polish investors) 
d)  MP (Mass Privatisation) 
e)  Sale to foreign investors 
f)  Public Offering at the Stock Exchange 
g)  Combination of above 
h)  Others (such as:) 
  
I 
 Is the Company  
a) Export oriented 
b) National Market oriented 
c) Local Market oriented 
(please indicate the percentage for each, from 0% to 100%) 
  
 
QUESTIONNAIRE  
(Choose the relevant answers with X next to the number) 
 
1. Do you think that public institutions (such as local administration, national 
government, chamber of commerce, public organisations and so on) are willing 
to help and to support your business? 
Yes: 5  
No:1 
1  2  3  4  5 
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2. Where do you find money capital to invest in Poland? 
 A lot:5 
 None at all:1 
a) Borrowing from bank  1  2  3  4  5 
b) Borrowing from friends  1  2  3  4  5 
c) Borrowing from your family  1  2  3  4  5 
d) Your own saving  1  2  3  4  5 
e) State aid  1  2  3  4  5 
f) Stock exchange  1  2  3  4  5 
g) Re investment of profits  1  2  3  4  5 
h) Other (such as:)  1  2  3  4  5 
 
3. Where do you find information about conducting business activity?  
A lot: 5 
None at all: 1 
 a) Public administration
31   1  2  3  4  5 
 b) Media        1  2  3  4  5 
 c) Friends       1  2  3  4  5 
 d) Colleagues       1  2  3  4  5 
 e) Business club   1  2  3  4  5 
 f) Foreign contacts      1  2  3  4  5 
 g) Chambers of Commerce   1  2  3  4  5 
 h) other (such as: )   1  2  3  4  5 
 
4. What were the main obstacles to start up your business? 
Very serious obstacles: 5 
No obstacles :1 
a) The search for information     1  2  3  4  5 
b) Lack of support by Polish 
government 
1  2  3  4  5 
c) Trust in the institutions 
32  1  2  3  4  5 
d) Bureaucracy        1  2  3  4  5 
e) Financial      
    
1  2  3  4  5 
f) Problem with the organized crime  1  2  3  4  5 
g) High bankruptcy risk   1  2  3  4  5 
h) Uncertainty of property rights   1  2  3  4  5 
i) Corruption problems   1  2  3  4  5 
j) Other (such as:)      1  2  3  4  5 
                                                 
31 By Public administration I mean local and national public administration, and public agencies. 
32  By  Institutions  I  mean  administrative,  political  and  economical  framework  such  as:  public  office, 
financial institutions, public administration, property rights, commercial law, etc.  
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5. How do you assess the role of the government
33 in fighting against corruption, 
grey market, too long bureaucratic process?  
Very good : 5 
Very bad : 1 
a) Corruption  1  2  3  4  5 
b) Grey Market  1  2  3  4  5 
c) Too long bureaucratic 
process 
1  2  3  4  5 
 
6. How do you assess the legal system in Poland? 
Very Good: 5 
Very bad : 1 
a) Protection of contract  1  2  3  4  5 
b) Judges  1  2  3  4  5 
c) Performance of Courts  1  2  3  4  5 
d) Police  1  2  3  4  5 
e) Legal protection of 
entrepreneurs  
against the organised crime    
1  2  3  4  5 
f) Reinforcement of property 
rights 
1  2  3  4  5 
g) Consistency of Law  1  2  3  4  5 
h) Completeness of Law  1  2  3  4  5 
 
 
 
7. Do you take advantage of services offered by the banking system? 
Yes, a lot: 5 
None at all :1 
a) Borrowing         1  2  3  4  5 
b) Saving         1  2  3  4  5 
c) Investment Fund       1  2  3  4  5 
d) Other (such as:)   1  2  3  4  5 
 
8. Do you trust Polish customers/suppliers and foreign customers/suppliers? 
 A lot: 5 
No trust: 1 
a) Polish customers   1  2  3  4  5 
b) Polish suppliers   1  2  3  4  5 
c) Foreign customers       1  2  3  4  5 
d) Foreign Suppliers   1  2  3  4  5 
 
                                                 
33 You should consider all governments between 1990 and 2002.  
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9. Do you think that in Poland there are still some old rules from the communist 
period that hinder your business? 
Yes, a lot : 5 
None at all : 1 
None 1  2  3  4  A lot 5 
 
10. Do you run your business in soft or hard budget constraint? 
Hard: 5  
Soft : 1  
1  2  3  4  5 
 
11. How long do you usually wait to receive the payment for the product/service? 
 (tick one or more of the relevant category) 
a) No time (to the delivery). 
b) Few days. 
c) 1 Month. 
d) 3 Months 
e) It depends on the financial situation of the customers. 
f) It depends on the will of the customers. 
g) It depends on the contract 
h) Other (such as: ) 
 
12. How do you decide the sale price of your product/service? 
Maximum: 5 
Minimum: 1 
a)  It depends on the price of other firms  1  2  3  4  5 
b) It depends on the tax that we have to pay  1  2  3  4  5 
c) It depends on the limits fixed by the 
administration  1  2  3  4  5 
d) It depends on the price of foreign product  1  2  3  4  5 
e) It depends on the market we sell to  1  2  3  4  5 
f)  It depends on the production costs  1  2  3  4  5 
g) It depends on other costs (such as:)  1  2  3  4  5 
h) It depends on unofficial additional payments  1  2  3  4  5 
i)  It depends on the concentration of the 
market  1  2  3  4  5 
j)  It depends on the transaction costs
34  1  2  3  4  5 
 
                                                 
34 Transaction costs are costs (official and unofficial) incurred in order to make an exchange, to transfer 
the property, to gather information, to protect own business etc.  
 
EJCE, vol. 3, n. 2 (2006) 
 
 
Available online at http://eaces.liuc.it 
230 
 
13. What is the impact of representative costs on the company budget 
35 in terms 
of: 
Very High: 5 
Very low: 1 
a)  Employers’ association  1  2  3  4  5 
b)  Chamber of Commerce  1  2  3  4  5 
c)  Lobbying  1  2  3  4  5 
d)  Local Administration  1  2  3  4  5 
e)  Political Parties  1  2  3  4  5 
f)  People in power  1  2  3  4  5 
g)  Other entertainment 
expenses  1  2  3  4  5 
h)  Other unofficial expenses  1  2  3  4  5 
i)  Protection  1  2  3  4  5 
j)  Advertising/Media/Gadget   1  2  3  4  5 
k)  Time cost of management 
spent with government 
officials 
1  2  3  4  5 
l)  Other (such as:)  1  2  3  4  5 
 
14. In the Polish business environment do you think some irregular additional 
payments have to be paid in the following items? 
Yes always: 5 
No, never: 1 
a) Respect of property rights  1  2  3  4  5 
b) Get selling licenses  1  2  3  4  5 
c) Gathering information   1  2  3  4  5 
d) Get public procurements   1  2  3  4  5 
e) To Start up business  1  2  3  4  5 
f) Other (such as:)  1  2  3  4  5 
 
                                                 
35 By representative Costs I mean every expense (official and unofficial) that the company must pay to 
conquer market, to be known, to have their interests well represented by lobbying, to have protection 
and so on. 
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15. Do you think, lobbies of entrepreneurs in Poland can affect the building 
and/or the change in the business legislation. 
Yes a lot: 5 
No, at all: 1  
1  2  3  4  5  
 
16. In which of the following sections do you think that lobbying towards your 
government would bring an improvement in the performance of your business 
sector?  
Yes a lot: 5 
 No at all: 1 
a)  Tax concessions or subsidies  1  2  3  4  5 
b)  Entry barriers to do business  1  2  3  4  5 
c)  Raise the prices of your 
products/services  1  2  3  4  5 
d)  Import tax and other barriers  1  2  3  4  5 
e)  Export subsidies or other helps  1  2  3  4  5 
f)  Other (such as:)  1  2  3  4  5 
 
17. Do you think there is any resistance by the below mentioned groups towards 
transition from planned economy to the market economy in Poland? 
Yes, a lot : 5 
None at all : 1  
a)  Successors of parties which 
existed before 1989 
36  1  2  3  4  5 
b) Elderly people  1  2  3  4  5 
c) Workers  1  2  3  4  5 
d) Previous nomenclature  1  2  3  4  5 
e) Elderly bureaucrats   1  2  3  4  5 
f)  Centre Right political 
parties which were set up 
after 1989 
37 
1  2  3  4  5 
g) Young people   1  2  3  4  5 
h) Unemployed   1  2  3  4  5 
i)  Other (such as: )  1  2  3  4  5 
                                                 
36 Present successors of the political parties, which existed before 1989, are for example SLD or PSL. 
37 Centre Right parties which were set up after 1989 may include both parties which are still present in the 
political arena and non existent any more: UD, KPN, AWS, UW, ROP,PC, PO, etc  
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18. How adapted, would you say, the public administration and the bureaucracy 
are in the context of the new market economy? 
Very adapted: 5 
Not adapted: 1 
1  2  3  4  5 
 
19. Do you agree with the reform process which has been taking place in Poland 
since the 90s? 
(Sign with X the relevant point) 
5) Yes, I completely agree  
4) I mostly agree  
3) I don’t know 
2) I mostly disagree 
1) No, I completely disagree  
 
20. In the last 2 years (2001/2002) your performance of sale: 
improved  Dropped  did not change 
 
21. In the last 2 years (2001/2002) the productivity 
38 of your enterprise: 
improved  Dropped  did not change 
 
22. In the last 2 years (2001/2002) the number of employees in your enterprise: 
 increased  Dropped  did not change 
 
23. Do your employees avoid the effort at work? 
Yes, they do: 1  
Not, they do not: 5 
Yes 1  2  3  4  Not 5 
 
24. What type of payment policy do you have in your enterprise? 
(tick one or more of the relevant category) 
a) Fixed wage 
b) Flexible wage 
c) Premium incentives 
d) Other bonus incentives 
e) Other (such as:)  
 
                                                 
38 Productivity means the relation between the output of your company and the inputs used in productive 
process.  
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25. How important are the following characteristics to you when you decide to 
employ someone?  
Very important : 5 
No important : 1 
a)  A high education (MA or above)  1  2  3  4  5 
b) Knowledge of foreign languages  1  2  3  4  5 
c) Communication skills  1  2  3  4  5 
d) Will to learn  1  2  3  4  5 
e) Previous experience  1  2  3  4  5 
f)  Reference from family  1  2  3  4  5 
g) Reference provided by other companies  1  2  3  4  5 
h) Reference from friends  1  2  3  4  5 
i)  A hard worker  1  2  3  4  5 
j)  Other (such as )  1  2  3  4  5 
 
26. Do you think that trade protectionism in Poland would help your Business? 
(Sign with X the relevant point) 
a) Yes  
b) No 
c) I do not know 
 
(This question needs to be answered by Polish Companies only) 
27. Are you in contact with foreign entrepreneurs?  
Intensive contacts: 5 
No contact: 1 
1  2  3  4  5 
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(This question needs to be answered by Polish Companies only) 
28. What kind of problems do you have with foreign entrepreneurs?  
(Do not answer this question if you have chosen the answer 1 in the previous question). 
Several 5 
None at all: 1  
a)  Judicial  1  2  3  4  5 
b) Language misunderstandings  1  2  3  4  5 
c) Different goals     1  2  3  4  5 
d) In relation to the customers  1  2  3  4  5 
e) Cultural 
39  1  2  3  4  5 
f)  Lack of trust   1  2  3  4  5 
g) Contractual differences  1  2  3  4  5 
h) Other (such as:)  1  2  3  4  5 
 
(This question needs to be answered by Polish Companies only) 
29. The presence of foreign entrepreneurs sometimes brings new rules to how 
people do business. Are these new rules different from the way you conduct 
business in the following areas? 
Very much : 5 
Not at all: 1 
a)  In the marketing strategy  1  2  3  4  5 
b) In the labour 
organisation  1  2  3  4  5 
c) In the management  1  2  3  4  5 
d) In the wage policy  1  2  3  4  5 
e) In the competition  1  2  3  4  5 
f)  In the rules to stipulate 
contracts  1  2  3  4  5 
g) Other (such as)  1  2  3  4  5 
 
                                                 
39 By cultural, I mean differences in terms of habits, values, and strategies to make profits, between Polish 
and foreign entrepreneurs.  
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 (This question needs to be answered by foreign Companies only) 
30. What kind of problems do you have with Polish entrepreneurs?  
 Several: 5 
None at all: 1  
a)  Judicial  1  2  3  4  5 
b)  Language 
misunderstandings  1  2  3  4  5 
c)  Different goals  1  2  3  4  5 
d)  In relations to the 
customers  1  2  3  4  5 
e)  Cultural 
40  1  2  3  4  5 
f)  Lack of trust  1  2  3  4  5 
g)  Contractual differences  1  2  3  4  5 
h)  Other (such as:)  1  2  3  4  5 
 
 (This question needs to be answered by foreign Companies only) 
31. What are your incentives to invest in Poland? 
Strong incentives:5 
No incentives:1 
a)  Lower labour cost (labour 
seeking)  1  2  3  4  5 
b)  Geographical position  1  2  3  4  5 
c)  Exploiting raw endowment 
resources (resource seeking)   1  2  3  4  5 
d)  Big Market (market seeking)  1  2  3  4  5 
e)  High returns  1  2  3  4  5 
f)  Low investment risk  1  2  3  4  5 
g)  Other (such as:)  1  2  3  4  5 
 
                                                 
40 By cultural, I mean differences in terms of habits, values and strategies to make profits, between foreign 
and Polish entrepreneurs.  
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(This question needs to be answered by foreign Companies only) 
32. What are the obstacles to invest in Poland? 
Very serious obstacles: 5 
No obstacles: 1 
a) Political instability  1  2  3  4  5 
b) Distance from EU market  1  2  3  4  5 
c) High country risk  1  2  3  4  5 
d) Trust in the institutions
41  1  2  3  4  5 
e) Respect of contracts  1  2  3  4  5 
f) Different consumers’ habits  1  2  3  4  5 
g) Different mentality of local 
entrepreneurs  1  2  3  4  5 
h) Adverse attitude of customers  1  2  3  4  5 
i) Adverse attitudes of consumers  1  2  3  4  5 
j) Mafia and corruption  1  2  3  4  5 
k) Protection of property rights  1  2  3  4  5 
l) Persistence of old rules from the 
communist period  1  2  3  4  5 
m) Mentality of elderly bureaucrats  1  2  3  4  5 
n) Lack of support by institutions 
and public agencies
42  1  2  3  4  5 
o) Other (such as:)  1  2  3  4  5 
 
(This question needs to be answered by foreign Companies only) 
33. When you invested in Poland, how much advantage did you take of each of 
the following items?  
Yes a lot: 5 
None at all: 1 
a) Polish banking and financial 
system  1  2  3  4  5 
b) Polish Agency for  
Foreign investment (PAIZ)  1  2  3  4  5 
c) Polish business club  1  2  3  4  5 
d) Polish management  1  2  3  4  5 
e) Banking and financial system  
of your country  1  2  3  4  5 
f) Business club of your country  1  2  3  4  5 
g) Management of your country  1  2  3  4  5 
h) Your own Saving  1  2  3  4  5 
i) Other (such as:)  1  2  3  4  5 
                                                 
41  By  Institutions  I  mean  administrative,  political  and  economical  framework  such  as:  public  office, 
financial institutions, public administration, property right, commercial law, etc. 
42 Such as Polish agency for foreign investment (PAIZ), and other Polish institutions.  
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(This question needs to be answered by export Companies only) 
34. Where do you get information about your export activity? 
A lot: 5 
None at all: 1 
a) Information provided by public agencies  1  2  3  4  5 
b) Local administration  1  2  3  4  5 
c) Business clubs  1  2  3  4  5 
d) From foreign investors running business in 
Poland  1  2  3  4  5 
e) National colleagues  1  2  3  4  5 
f) Foreign colleagues  1  2  3  4  5 
g) Polish embassy  1  2  3  4  5 
h) Trade office representative abroad  1  2  3  4  5 
i) Press  1  2  3  4  5 
j) Friends  1  2  3  4  5 
k) Chambers of Commerce   1  2  3  4  5 
l) Other (such as:)  1  2  3  4  5 
 
(This question needs to be answered by export Company only) 
35. What are the main problems with exporting? 
A lot: 5 
None at all: 1 
a)  Export credit guarantee  1  2  3  4  5 
b)  Credit finance for export  1  2  3  4  5 
c)  Market information  1  2  3  4  5 
d)  Insurance  1  2  3  4  5 
e)  Information and regulation  1  2  3  4  5 
f)  Information on quality control  1  2  3  4  5 
g)  Information on relevant business 
practices  1  2  3  4  5 
h)  The type of package  1  2  3  4  5 
i)  Contact with foreign buyers  1  2  3  4  5 
j)  Trade representative abroad  1  2  3  4  5 
k)  Transport  1  2  3  4  5 
l)  Zloty exchange rate too overvalued  1  2  3  4  5 
m) Lack of trust in the foreign customers  1  2  3  4  5 
n)  Lack of support by institutions and 
public agencies  1  2  3  4  5 
o)  Financial situation of foreign 
customers  1  2  3  4  5 
p)  Other (such as: )  1  2  3  4  5  
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(The following questions are about accession to the EU. They need to be answered by 
all Companies) 
(sign with X the relevant point) 
36. Do you support the Polish accession to the EU? 
a) Yes  
b) No  
c) I do not know 
      
37. How consistent do you think that the new laws promoted under the push 
for harmonisation to EU legislation (with regards do business) are with the way 
in which you do business? 
Very consistent: 5 
Not consistent: 1 
1  2  3   4   5 
 
38. Do you know the European legislation relevant to your business?  
a) Yes  
b) Some 
c) None at all 
 
39. Do your products/services respect the European Norms? 
100 %: 5 
 0 %: 1 
in terms of: 
a) Quality control  1  2  3  4  5 
b) Safety of workers  1  2  3  4  5 
c) Competition  1  2  3  4  5 
 
40. Does your company declare all year’s turnout to relevant authorities (Tax 
Office)? 
Yes 
Partly 
Not 
  